The Asia Pacific region was characterized in the second half of the twentieth century by an absence of regional trading arrangements. The situations changed after 2000, raising questions of sequencing and of the boundaries of the region. This paper argues that the proliferation of regional and bilateral agreements has been driven by the rapid emergence of regional value chains and centres on trade facilitation measures. These create deep regionalism and variable boundaries, depending upon which countries integrate into the regional value chains.
1

REGIONALISM IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION: HOW WIDE, HOW DEEP?
Until 1995, when the World Trade Organization (WTO) was established, regionalism was conspicuously absent from East Asia. During the GATT era it was common to contrast the situation in East Asia with the waves of regional trading arrangements (RTAs) occurring in Europe, the Americas and Africa. Korea and Japan were the only countries among the charter members of the WTO not party to any RTAs. China was busy negotiating accession to the WTO and pursued a multilateral trade policy. 1 The only RTA in East Asia was the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and by common consent ASEAN had had little impact on trade flows since its inception in 1967.
In sharp contrast, the twenty-first century has seen East Asia in the vanguard of a new wave of regional and bilateral trade agreements. What explains this sharp change of direction? If East Asian regionalism is thriving, this raises two further questions: how wide is the region that it covers and what is the content of, or how deep is, the regional integration?
This paper argues that regionalism in East Asia is now a substantial phenomenon.
Regionalism did not flourish in the second half of the twentieth century because Asian countries pursued inward-oriented development strategies or, when they pursued outwardoriented strategies, their trade was overwhelmingly with countries outside the region. IntraAsian preferential trading arrangements held no attraction and when countries liberalized trade policies it was on a non-discriminatory basis (Section 1). Several catalysts encouraged monetary integration after 1997 and talk of an Asian sequence of monetary integration preceding trade integration, but actual steps in the monetary sphere have been small (Section 2a). In contrast, since 2000 there has been an explosion of bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements, targeting non-tariff or regulatory impediments to trade The proliferation of agreements has raised concerns about how to simplify the noodle bowl and consolidate regional arrangements, which in turn raises questions about which countries to include in consolidated Asian regional arrangements (Section 2b). The driving force behind East Asian regionalism is identified in Section 3 as the rapid growth of intra-regional trade centred on regional value chains. In a region of low most-favoured nation tariffs, the functioning of regional value chains can be facilitated by bilateral or plurilateral agreements. The concluding section argues that East Asian regionalism will continue to deepen because trade facilitation addresses "beyond trade" issues of harmonization, mutual recognition of 1 Mongolia, which joined the WTO in 1997, and Taiwan also had non-discriminatory trade policies.
regulations and so forth, and its width will be related to the geographical reach of the regional value chains.
Regionalism in East Asia 1950-2000
During the 1960s many observers saw the global trading system caught in a headlong rush to regionalism. 2 Following the example of Western Europe, an alphabet soup of regional trading arrangements was created in Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa. These non- of preference (Ando and Kimura, 2005) . The net result was that AFTA"s preferential tariffs had a very small impact on trade in the 1990s (Manchin and Pelkmans-Balaoing, 2008) .
AFTA was the only RTA in East Asia in the second half of the twentieth century.
Sub-regional trading zones emerged in the Pearl River Delta (the PRD involved Hong Kong, Macau and Guangdong Province of China) and around Singapore (Sijori, or Singapore, Johor and Riau), but these were market-driven, with some public policy measures to facilitate cross-border trade and investment (Pomfret, 1996) . Other sub-regional zones or "growth triangles" tried to replicate the success of the PRD or Sijori, with more state involvement and less economic impact. In Northeast Asia the Tumen River Project, a state-driven subregional zone involving the Koreas, China, Japan and Mongolia, had little economic effect.
Although AFTA had little impact as a conventional RTA with preferential tariffs, cooperation among ASEAN members did have economic effects during the 1990s.
Singapore already had liberal and efficient trade arrangements, but Indonesia, Malaysia,
Thailand and, to a lesser extent, the Philippines all began to streamline their border facilities. 
Asian Regionalism in the Twenty-first Century
The 1997 were concluded by East Asian countries. 6 The Executives' Meeting of East Asia-Pacific Central Banks was established in 1991 and currently has eleven members (the original ASEAN5, Australia, China, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea and New Zealand). 7 The ASEM summits in Bangkok (1996) , London (1998) and Seoul (2000) were attended by leaders of the fifteen EU countries, seven ASEAN countries, China, Japan and Korea. 8 Lee, Koo and Park (2008) describe the dramatic change in the three countries' positions on trade agreements. Using a gravity model, they conclude that the Three have not been adversely affected by the existence of major regional RTAs, which implies that the post-2000 increase in RTAs in East Asia is internally driven rather than a defensive response to developments elsewhere. 9 China turned to bilateral trade agreements after completing its WTO accession negotiations. China had an advantage over Japan and Korea insofar as its FTA with ASEAN could obtain a WTO waiver of most-favoured nation treatment under the Enabling Clause which governs preferential arrangements among developing countries, whereas any Japanese or Korean FTAs have to gain waivers under the stricter conditions of Article XXIV. was followed by reductions in the restrictions to labour and capital movement, and finally by monetary union at least among some European Union members.
The slow progress on intra-Asian trade liberalization combined with the establishment of the CMI encouraged some observers to identify a distinctive Asian sequence of monetary integration preceding trade integration. There is some logic to the idea that monetary integration will facilitate intra-regional trade (Dieter and Higgott, 2003) . However, the empirical support for the Asian sequence remains slight (Pomfret, 2005 The ASEAN+3 finance ministers decided to multilateralize the CMI swap arrangements, so that a country with balance-of-payments problems can access the entire pool, which the ministers agreed should amount to a total of US$120 billion. However, issues such as economic surveillance before release of CMIM funds and monitoring to ensure due diligence after disbursement remain unresolved. 11 Dieter (2007, 139) similarly concludes that "monetary regionalism in Asia will both be a complex endeavour and will -if at all -only be achieved in the long run." Grimes (2009) takes a slightly more upbeat position on the process, but from an international relations perspective of how the CMI, ABMI etc affect interaction between Japan, China and the USA rather than from a perspective of enhanced regional financial market integration or monetary coordination.
were achieved by a fudge: the share of China plus Hong Kong is equal to that of Japan, although Hong Kong is in many respects a separate economic entity and was not party to the CMI. 12 Even beyond the tensions between the established and rising economic power for supremacy, it is uncertain what the weight should be of the mid-rank economic powers, led by Korea but also including the larger ASEAN economies.
In the twenty-first century, East Asian regional agreements have primarily concerned trade. The spread of trade agreements in Asia has been documented by Menon (2007) , Kawai and Wignaraja (2007) , Lee et al. (2009) and ADB (2008) . However, it is difficult to generalize about the agreements" content. Many of the agreements lack much serious content, and address specific, sometimes apparently minor, issues (Pomfret, 2007) . The agreements are not primarily about tariff barriers, but more often about reducing border and behind-the-border trade costs.
Reflecting the accelerated pace of regional integration, an initiative to establish an Goods between ASEAN and China was signed; it envisaged establishment of a free-trade 12 Japan will contribute $38.4 billion, or 32% of the $120 billion total, while China will contribute $34.2 billion and Hong Kong $4.2 billion. Thus Japan is the largest single contributor and China and Hong Kong are the biggest co-equal contributors. These shares contrast to earlier arrangements such as funding of the Asian Development Bank, in which China"s share is less than half of Japan"s. Korea"s contribution to the CMIM is $24 billion and other contributions less than $5 billion per country. As a reference point, Korea's bilateral swap agreement with the US Federal Reserve is for up to $30 billion; Japan's liquidity swap agreement with the US Fed is unlimited.
area by 2010 for six ASEAN members and by 2015 for the four newest ASEAN members. In addition, the framework agreement foresaw more comprehensive liberalization, with agriculture, human resource development, information and communication technology, investment, and development of the Mekong River Basin identified as priority areas (Sen, 2004, 76) and collaboration on illegal immigration, drug smuggling, counterterrorism and other security concerns also on the agenda (Kwei, 2006, 121) .
In sum, despite the stimulus of regional dissatisfaction with international monetary institutions during the 1997-8 Asian Crisis and the CMI, regionalism in East Asia has been primarily in trade. This is consistent with the observation by Estevadeordal and Suominen There was also no clarification of the relative roles of the East Asia summits and the ASEAN+3 summits in the evolving regional architecture.
13 Russia participated in the first EAS as an observer at the invitation of 2005 host Malaysia and its request to become a future member seems to be supported by China and India, but no formal progress has been made. Timor-Leste is seeking ASEAN membership and became a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum in July 2005; presumably any new member of ASEAN would also join the EAS.
It is not essential that all functions of regional institutions be met by organizations with a common membership, and Australia in particular has pushed for "variable geometry" as a practical way forward. However, if there is a core membership, there will inevitably be competition to be included in the core and for pre-eminence within the core. One consequence of the East Asia Summit was to highlight the competition for regional leadership. Even though China gave way to Japan on the invitation list, the summit was a Chinese initiative and Japan felt a need to respond. The Japanese proposal of a
Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia among the 16 East Asia Summit participants was controversial, especially because it seems even more than the EAEC to be an RTA that excludes the USA. The various forums reflect Great Power competition, with Japan using the broader East Asia Summit membership to counterbalance China"s success with a more functional approach towards relations with ASEAN and in various bilateral agreements. which include not only the G8 countries but also the major Latin American economies, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, India and Australia. From East Asia the G20 included Japan, China, Korea and Indonesia. ASEAN was represented by Thailand which held the rotating presidency. However, in future Thailand will not be represented and could legitimately question why Indonesia has a seat and it does not when their GDP is roughly equal. Midsized economic powers such as Australia and Korea are vigorous supporters of the G20 grouping, because it represents a number which will just include them; with more exclusive membership Australia and Korea would likely be excluded and in a bigger group each country"s weight would be smaller. 16 Similar tensions surround the composition of the UN Security Council, where the five permanent members are jealous of their position while countries such as Japan, India, Germany or Brazil consider their claim to be at least equal to that of an existing member. In Asia this plays out in competition between regional organizations. China has greater influence within the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP). Japan has more influence, because it provides the largest share of funding, in the Asian Development Bank (ADB).
In sum, the geographical extent of Asian regionalism remains in a fluid state. The core in recent years has been ASEAN. In the twenty-first century ASEAN"s institutional relations with China have strengthened, and much of the action has centred on the reaction of Japan to the challenge of China"s growing economic significance and concerns of other countries such as Korea or in a wider circle Australia and India about their role in regional institutional developments. Such concerns are counter-productive for cooperation and regional integration because power and influence are zero-sum games. They may be even more corrosive in Asia because, in the absence of clear geographical borders defined by mountains or water, the geometry of Asian regionalism is variable. 17 The arena for fighting over influence itself becomes a source of endless manoeuvring with little net benefit.
16 Korea and Australia both favour the idea that the Asian G6 from the G20 countries should play a strategic agenda-setting role on Asian regional issues. Australian Prime Minister Rudd"s proposals along these lines in Singapore (speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue summit on 29 May 2009) would not have been popular with his hosts who have seen Singapore as a hub for ASEAN and East Asian regionalization. Korea is devoting much energy to hosting the G20 finance ministers` meeting in 2010 and, as G20 chair for the year, is responsible for preparing for the 2010 summit. 17 To the north and west, Central Asia and Mongolia are geographically and culturally closely linked to neighbouring provinces of China, and organizations such as Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization bridge these countries. To the south west, India and Pakistan are linked by history and institutionally in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), while Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Central Asian countries, Azerbaijan, Turkey and Iran are members of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). To the southeast Papua New Guinea and Timor-Leste are contiguous with Indonesia and the three countries are neighbours of Australia, while including New Zealand in
Driving Forces behind Asian Regionalism
Until the 1990s the trade of Asian countries was largely with countries outside the region.
Japan initiated a trend towards integrated production chains within East Asia when it invested heavily in Southeast Asia after the yen"s post-1985 appreciation. Intraregional trade and investment in East Asia began to increase rapidly during the 1990s, and by 1996 intraregional trade accounted for 50% of the East Asian countries" total trade, compared to about a third at the start of the 1980s.
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As Asian incomes and demand rose, regional markets became more important. 19 At the same time regional value chains began to emerge, a pattern documented in the "Emerging
Asian Regionalism" project (ADB, 2008) .
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Regional networks became denser in the 1990s
and China played an increasingly central role. 21 Intra-industry trade (IIT) increased rapidly; Kimura, Takahashi and Hayakawa (2007), Haddad (2007) and Gruenwald and Hori (2008) provide evidence that Asian IIT is vertical intra-industry trade associated with fragmentation of production rather than the horizontal intra-industry trade due to product differentiation observed in Europe. 22 Input-output analysis of the destination of Asian exports of final goods reinforces the conclusion that the region still relies on markets beyond the region.
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The emergence and rapid growth of regional value chains created pressures for trade facilitation because fragmentation of the production process is only profitable if the cost of this group provides a link across Polynesia. This last link suggests that the Pacific Ocean itself may be a bridge, which is reflected in the concept and composition of APEC. 18 The share of intraregional trade in total exports dipped after the Asian Crisis, but climbed back to 52% in 2004, when the import share was 57% (Munakata, 2006, 47) . These are higher than equivalent measures for NAFTA and similar to those for the EU in the mid-1980s. Trade intensity indices also show increasing trade within the East Asia region during the 1990s (Sohn, 2002; Ng and Yeats, 2003) . This section draws on material analysed in greater depth in Pomfret (forthcoming). 19 The increased regionalization of the East Asian economy is described in Frankel and Kahler (1993) , Hatch and Yamamura (1996) , Aggarwal and Morrison (1998, 65-86) , Lincoln (2004, 42-113) , Munakata (2006, 37-61) , Rajan (2006) and Dean and Lovely (2008) . 20 Ando and Kimura (2005) calculate very high shares of machinery (HS84-92) in East Asian countries" trade in 1996 and 2000, and conclude that this structure is especially suited to production fragmentation. Pomfret (forthcoming) discusses the emergence of regional value chains in East Asia in greater depth. 21 Gaulier, Lemoine and Ünal-Kesenci (2006) and Athukorala (2007) Baldwin (2006) sees the recent Asian trade agreements posing a threat to intra-regional trade. He diagnoses Asian regionalism as suffering from the "Noodle Bowl Syndrome" and argues that these complex and undisciplined trade agreements will disrupt "the smooth functioning of "Factory Asia" ... [which is dependent on] . . the free flow of intra-regional trade". This argument fails to explain why the agreements have proliferated since the late 1990s. Baldwin ascribes the proliferation to a "big-hearted gesture" from China to assuage ASEAN fears of Chinese competition and the domino effect that followed the China-ASEAN FTA, but China (like most economic powers) is not noted for big-heartedness and freeing up bilateral trade would exacerbate any fears that ASEAN countries might have harboured. 25 In many key sectors tariffs are not an issue. Much of the shipping of electronics components that dominates, for example, Korea-China trade is covered by the multilateral Information Technology Products Agreement signed at the 1996 WTO Ministerial in Singapore. Moreover, import of intermediates is frequently exempt from duties as long as the product is eventually exported.
example, has a very short chapter on tariffs, and country-specific schedules for tariff reductions, while the other twelve chapters concern measures to improve the environment in which trade occurs, with improved customs procedures, smoother quarantine processes, more transparent rules and regulations, the alignment of standards and so forth. The bilateral agreements are often scoffed for failure to reduce tariffs and for claiming to be WTO-Plus, but the latter label is accurate insofar as the agreements address trade facilitation measures which have not been part of past rounds of WTO multilateral trade negotiations, and are only weakly represented on the Doha agenda.
Future Prospects
In sum, there has been considerable activity aimed at reducing trade costs in East Asia. Some of this is in a broad Asia-Pacific context, but most determinedly it has centred on ASEAN since the mid-1990s and subsequently included China, and to a lesser extent Japan and Korea.
This has coincided with increased regionalization of East Asian trade and the growing importance of regional value chains. The needs of participants in these value chains have driven unilateral, bilateral and regional moves to reduce trade costs.
When regionalism finally arrived in East Asia it centred on trade, but on trade facilitation rather than traditional trade policies. In this sense it is deep integration because it addresses issues of domestic administration and regulation that are beyond the scope of the first four stages of Balassa"s taxonomy, but it is unlikely to encompass meaningful monetary integration in the near future. The width of Asian regionalism is likely to be determined by the geographical range of the regional value chains.
Finally, a distinctive feature of the new regionalism in Asia is its openness and essentially non-discriminatory nature. For example, although trade facilitation measures within ASEAN are agreed at a regional level or among a subset of members, improved documentation, port logistics and so forth reduce costs of trade with all partners; a ThaiMalaysian bilateral agreement to reduce border costs, e.g. by simplifying customs forms or having a one-stop process, is likely to benefit all traders crossing the Malaysian or Thai border. Thus the current wave of East Asian regionalism with its plethora of bilateral and plurilateral agreements is not creating an EU or NAFTA style of RTA with clear-cut external borders, but a less well-defined area of trader-friendly conditions centred on ASEAN and
China but with malleable outer limits.
